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NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
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Docket Nos. 14-000123 and 14-000124 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 





SHANEY GRANGER, in her official capacity as Regional 
Administrator for Region XIII of the United States 
Environmental Protection Agency, 
Respondent, 
and 
SAVE OUR CLIMATE, INC., 
Petitioner, 
v. 
SHANEY GRANGER, in her official capacity as Regional 
Administrator for Region XIII of the United States 
Environmental Protection Agency, 
Respondent. 
 
ON CONSOLIDATED PETITIONS FOR REVIEW OF A 
FINAL ORDER OF THE REGIONAL ADMINISTRATOR 
 
Brief of SAVE OUR CLIMATE, L.L.C., Petitioner 
 
* This brief has been reprinted in its original format. Please note that the Table 
of Authorities and Table of Contents for this brief have been omitted. 
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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This is a petition for review of a PSD permit issued under the 
Clean Air Act by a state agency through its delegated authority of 
the EPA.  Petitioners Save Our Climate, Inc., and Sylvanergy, 
L.L.C., timely filed petitions for review of the permit with the 
Environmental Appeals Board under 40 C.F.R. pt. 124 (2015).  
The EAB issued its order on June 1, 2015.  Save Our Climate and 
Sylvanergy then filed timely petitions for review in this Court, 
less than 60 days after June 1, 2015.  Sylvanergy, however, also 
petitions this Court to review the state agency’s applicability 
determination, which preceded the issuance of the PSD permit.  
At the very latest, Sylvanergy had date notice of the applicability 
determination on June 12, 2014, when the state agency issued 
the PSD permit. 
This Court has jurisdiction under section 42 U.S.C. § 
7607(b)(1) (2012), which provides that a petition for review of 
final EPA action shall be filed in the United States Court of 
Appeals for the appropriate circuit within 60 days from the date 
notice of the final action. Id.  Therefore, this Court has 
jurisdiction over the timely-filed petitions for review of the PSD 
permit issued to Sylvanergy, but does not have jurisdiction over 
Sylvanergy’s petition for review of the state agency’s applicability 
determination, as it was not filed within 60 days of the date 
notice of the action. 
 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
I. Whether this Court has jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 
7607(b)(1) to review Sylvanergy’s untimely petition of NUARB’s 
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II. Whether NUARB was arbitrary and capricious in 
determining that the Sylvanergy facility is a “major emitting 
facility” subject to PSD review. 
 
III. Whether Sylvanergy is subject to PSD review as an emitter of 
greenhouse gases. 
 
IV. Whether NUARB properly rejected consideration of a wood 
gasification and partial carbon capture and storage plant as 
BACT on the grounds that it “redefines the source.” 
 
V. Whether NUARB properly selected the Sustainable Forest 
Plan as BACT without considering its adverse environmental 
impacts. 
 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a petition for judicial review of a permitting 
authority’s decision to grant a Prevention of Significant 
Deterioration (“PSD”) permit to a new facility.  Specifically, 
Sylvanergy, L.L.C., seeks to build a new electricity generation 
and wood pellet production facility in Forestdale, New Union.  
Because the entire State of New Union is an attainment area, 
new “major emitting” facilities are required to obtain a PSD 
preconstruction permit, ensuring that their facilities will meet 
certain emission limitations.  These permits are reviewed and 
granted by the New Union Air Resources Board (“NUARB”), 
which exercises delegated authority of the EPA. 
Sylvanergy’s proposed facility (the “Facility”) would operate 
by way of an advanced stoker design wood-fired boiler along with 
two ultra-low sulfur diesel start-up burners.  The Village of 
Forestdale issued a site plan approval with a limitation on the 
Facility’s operating hours, limiting it to 6,500 hours per year and 
a capacity factor of 75%. 
Sylvanergy petitioned NUARB for a Non-Applicability 
Determination (“NAD”), arguing that the PSD permitting process 
3
  
136 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW ONLINE [Vol.  7 
 
was not applicable to the proposed facility because its emissions 
would not meet certain thresholds bringing it within the 
definition of “major emitting facility,” under the Clean Air Act 
(“CAA”).  NUARB rejected these arguments and required that 
Sylvanergy’s new facility undergo the PSD permitting process.  
NUARB approved Sylvanergy’s flue controls for particulates, 
sulphur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, carbon monoxide, and VOCs as 
constituting Best Available Control Technology (“BACT”).  These 
permit requirements are not being challenged.  NUARB also 
required Sylvanergy’s facility to undergo PSD review for 
greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions based on its release of 350,000 
tons per year when operating at a 96% capacity factor. 
Under the BACT analysis for GHGs, NUARB considered four 
control technologies.  It eliminated the first technology, carbon 
capture and storage, on the grounds that it would not control the 
CO2 from the flue controls.  It eliminated the second technology, 
the use of cleaner fuels, on the grounds that it would 
impermissibly redefine the source by requiring the facility to 
change its planned fuel.  It eliminated the third technology, wood 
gasification and partial carbon capture and storage, on the 
grounds that it would also redefine the source.  NUARB accepted 
the fourth technology, a Sustainable Forest Plan, as BACT 
because it would offset about 70% of GHG emissions and was 
required by Executive Order 005-12, which requires state 
agencies to try to achieve carbon neutrality. 
Sylvanergy and Save Our Climate (“SOC”) both filed 
petitions for review to the Environmental Appeals Board (“EAB”).  
Sylvanergy argued that it should have received its NAD and that 
it was not subject to PSD review for GHG emissions.  SOC 
asserted that denial of the NAD was correct.  However, SOC 
argued it was error for NUARB to reject wood gasification and 
partial carbon capture and to select the Sustainable Forest Plan 
as BACT without considering the adverse environmental effects 
raised during the comment period. 
The EAB denied both parties’ petitions for review, stating 
that neither displayed clear legal or factual error on the part of 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts of this case center on the details of the facility that 
Sylvanergy seeks to build and how those facts impact the 
facility’s regulation under the CAA. 
The Proposed Facility.  Sylvanergy proposes to construct a 
500 million Btu/hour electricity generation and wood pellet 
production facility in Forestdale, New Union. R. at 5.  The 
Facility would include an advanced stoker design wood-fired 
boiler together with two ultra-low sulfur diesel (ULSD) start-up 
burners, each with a maximum heat input rate of 60 MMBtu/hr. 
Id.  The Facility would have an electrical generation capacity of 
40-MW and would be located approximately 2 km from the center 
of Forestdale. Id. 
Based on a 96% capacity factor, the Facility would emit the 
following amounts of air pollutants (in tons per year): 
 PM 2.5:63 
 SO2: 45 
 NOx: 110 
 CO:255 
 VOC: 40. 
Id.  However, as part of the site plan approval process for the 
Village of Forestdale, the Facility’s operation is limited to no 
more than 6,500 hours per year, which limits the Facility to a 
capacity factor of 75%. Id.  This limitation was adopted to 
mitigate the impact of log trucks bringing raw logs to the Facility 
for processing into pellet fuel. Id.  The limitation is included in 
the site plan approval and can be enforced by the building 
inspector of the Village of Forestdale. Id.  Based on this 75% 
capacity factor, the Facility would emit the following amounts of 
air pollutants (in tons per year): 
 PM 2.5:47 
 SO2: 32 
 NOx:80 
 CO:190 
 VOC: 30. 
5
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Id.  In addition, the Facility would emit 350,000 tons per year of 
greenhouse gas emissions in carbon dioxide equivalents (CO2e) 
when operating at 96% capacity. Id. 
The NAD Petition.  NUARB is authorized to issue 
preconstruction permits under  § 7475 of the CAA pursuant to the 
EPA’s delegation of authority. Id.  The entire State of New Union 
is considered to be an attainment, or PSD area, under the CAA. 
Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 7407(d) (2012). 
On January 15, 2013, Sylvanergy petitioned NUARB for a 
NAD, which is a determination that it is not required to obtain a 
PSD preconstruction permit under § 7475 of the CAA. Id.  
Sylvanergy believed it did not have the potential to emit 
pollutants in excess of the relevant thresholds under § 7479(1) for 
two reasons. Id. 
First, Sylvanergy contended it was not a “fossil-fuel fired” 
source subject to the 100-ton-per year, “major emitting facility” 
threshold applicable to such plants. R. at 6.  Second, Sylvanergy 
contended that it did not have the potential to emit more than the 
otherwise-applicable threshold of 250 tons per year of regulated 
pollutants. Id.  In making this argument, Sylvanergy relied on 
the Village of Forestdale site plan approval’s limitation on hours 
of operation to reduce its potential to emit carbon monoxide below 
the threshold. Id.  NUARB rejected these arguments and denied 
the NAD. Id.  In doing so, NUARB reasoned that the Facility’s 
inclusion of ULSD start-up burners made it a fossil-fuel fired 
facility, and that the operating hours restriction in the site plan 
was not a “federally enforceable” limitation, as required by 40 
C.F.R. § 52.21(b)(4), in order to reduce the Facility’s emitting 
potential below the thresholds. Id. 
The PSD Permit.  Sylvanergy then filed for a PSD 
preconstruction permit, and NUARB published a draft of the 
permit on September 12, 2013, with the relevant applicability 
determination information. Id.  Save Our Climate (“SOC”), a non-
profit environmental protection group, filed extensive public 
comments. Id.  NUARB issued the permit on June 12, 2014. Id.  
NUARB approved Sylvanergy’s flue controls for particulates, 
sulphur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, carbon monoxide, and VOCs as 
constituting Best Available Control Technology (“BACT”). Id.  
These permit requirements are not being challenged. Id. 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol7/iss1/5
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NUARB also conducted a BACT review for GHG emissions 
from the Facility, using a 96% capacity factor. Id.  Sylvanergy 
argued that it should be viewed as having zero GHG emissions, 
but NUARB disagreed. Id.  SOC filed detailed comments on the 
proposed permit and argued that BACT for the GHGs emitted 
from the Facility was a wood gasification and partial carbon 
capture and storage plant. Id. 
The BACT Analysis.  NUARB then conducted what it 
considered to be a top-down approach to available control 
technologies for GHGs. Its analysis went as follows: 
a. NUARB considered carbon capture and storage as the 
technology with the greatest reduction of GHGs, but it 
rejected the technology on the grounds that there was no 
proven technology for removing CO2 from the dilute flue 
gas streams that result from biomass combustion. 
b. NUARB considered whether alternative fuels such as 
natural gas or oil would lower carbon emissions for a 40-
MW generation facility, but it rejected this option because 
it would redefine the Facility. 
c. NUARB also rejected the implementation of wood 
gasification and partial carbon capture stating it would 
redefine the Facility. 
d. NUARB then considered the implementation of a 
Sustainable Forest Plan, which would require Sylvanergy 
to purchase and maintain a dedicated reforestation area.  
NUARB reasoned that, based on an assumed production 
rate of 10 dry tons of wood per hectare per year, 
acquisition of 25,000 hectares of dedicated forest land 
would offset about 70% of GHG emissions and would cost 
about $10 million.  NUARB also maintained that this was 
required by New Union Executive Order 005-12, issued by 
Governor Halley Comet, on recommendation of the 
Governor’s Task Force on Climate Change and 
Sustainability.  Under Executive Order 005-12, all state 
agencies in New Union must, to the maximum extent 
allowed by law, ensure that any new construction project 
they undertake or approve will be carbon neutral. 
R. at 6-7. 
7
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Sylvanergy and SOC each filed timely petitions for review of 
the permit with the EAB. R. at 7.  The EAB determined that it 
lacked jurisdiction to review NUARB’s NAD. Id.  The EAB 
further held that neither party’s petition for review identified a 
clearly erroneous factual or legal determination that would justify 
granting the petition for review. R. at 13.  Accordingly, the 
petitions were denied. R. at 14.  Sylvanergy and SOC then filed 
petitions under § 7607(b) seeking judicial review of the PSD 
preconstruction permit. 
 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Under the Clean Air Act’s judicial review statute, Sylvanergy 
had 60 days from the date notice of NUARB’s denial of its request 
for a NAD.  Because Sylvanergy did not meet this filing deadline, 
and due to the filing deadline’s jurisdictional nature, this Court 
lacks jurisdiction to review NUARB’s applicability determination.  
Further, even if this Court did have jurisdiction to review 
NUARB’s determination, NUARB correctly determined that 
Sylvanergy was a “major emitting facility” because it is a “fossil-
fuel fired” source due to its combustion of fossil fuels and its 
potential to emit more than 100 tons per year of regulated 
pollutants; additionally, there are no “federally enforceable” 
limitations to bring its carbon monoxide emissions below 250 tons 
per year—it is a “major emitting facility” subject to PSD review 
under either category.   
NUARB correctly determined that Sylvanergy is required to 
undergo PSD review for GHG emissions under the Supreme 
Court’s ruling in Utility Air Regulatory Group.  In light of this 
ruling and the EPA’s implementing regulation, major sources 
that are subject to PSD review for other criteria pollutants must 
also undergo PSD review for GHGs if they are expected to emit 
more than a de minimis amount.  Sylvanergy’s proposed facility is 
expected to emit 350,000 tons per year of GHGs—well above a de 
minimis rate.  Because Sylvanergy was required to undergo PSD 
review for its other criteria pollutant emissions, it is now required 
to also undergo PSD review for GHGs. 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol7/iss1/5
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When regulation of GHG emitters began, the EPA published 
the Deferral Rule, exempting biogenic emissions for a three-year 
period.  This rule, however, was vacated by the D.C. Circuit in 
Center for Biological Diversity.  Even if the rule had not been 
vacated, it could not operate to exempt Sylvanergy’s facility 
because, by the rule’s own language, it would have expired.  
Accordingly, Sylvanergy would not have been exempt and would 
now be subject to PSD review for GHGs. 
Under PSD review, NUARB erred in its BACT analysis by 
excluding wood gasification and partial carbon capture and 
storage.  NUARB correctly determined that the technology was 
feasible in Step Two of the analysis; however, it incorrectly 
eliminated the technology on the grounds that it “redefined the 
source.”  It has long been accepted that requiring a facility to 
change its primary fuel source or to completely redesign its 
facility is impermissible in determining BACT.  Requiring minor 
changes, however, in order to accommodate new technology is 
acceptable.  Partial carbon capture and storage may require 
Sylvanergy to make minor modifications to the construction of the 
Facility, but it still retains the fundamental purpose and fuel 
source.  Accordingly, it does not redefine the Facility. 
NUARB further erred in its BACT analysis by failing to 
consider the adverse environmental impacts of the Sustainable 
Forest Plan.  SOC raised significant concerns regarding the 
negative environmental impacts the plan would have; however, 
these comments were never addressed by NUARB.  Indeed, 
NUARB ignored these concerns and instead relied on an 
inapplicable state-issued Executive Order to justify the plan.  The 
EPA’s regulations require that the permitting authority 
adequately consider each concern and provide detailed analyses 
for rejecting any concerns.  NUARB failed to do either of these 
and dismissed the issues with a conclusory statement.  This 
clearly violates the EPA’s regulations and warrants reversible 
error.  As a result, this Court should remand this case for 
NUARB to conduct a correct BACT analysis as required by the 
EPA. 
 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
9
  
142 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW ONLINE [Vol.  7 
 
Under section 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act 
(“APA”), NUARB’s decision is presumed to be valid. Sierra Club 
v. Jackson, 833 F. Supp. 2d 11, 17-18 (D.C. Cir. 2012).  
Nevertheless, the Court “must reject agency action if it is 
‘arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in 
accordance with law.’” Id. at 18 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) 
(2012)).  Even an agency decision of “less than ideal clarity” 
should be upheld so long as “the agency’s path may reasonably be 
discerned.” Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 




I.  THIS COURT LACKS JURISDICTION TO REVIEW 
NUARB’S DENIAL OF SYLVANERGY’S REQUEST 
FOR A NON-APPLICABILITY DETERMINATION 
BECAUSE IT IS TIME-BARRED UNDER § 
7607(B)’S 60-DAY FILING DEADLINE. 
The EAB appropriately framed this Court’s jurisdiction over 
Sylvanergy’s petition for review of NUARB’s applicability 
determination: “Sylvanergy had the option of seeking judicial 
review of the denial of the NAD, and failed to avail itself of that 
option.” R. at 8 (emphasis added).  Under § 7607(b), an aggrieved 
party must file a petition for review within 60 days of the date on 
which the EPA’s action appears in the Federal Register. 42 U.S.C. 
§ 7607(b)(1) (2012).  Moreover, because the 60-day filing deadline 
in § 7607(b) is jurisdictional, it rings the death knell for 
Sylvanergy’s petition for review of NUARB’s applicability 
determination.  Sylvanergy did not petition this Court to review 
NUARB’s denial of the NAD within 60 days of its notice of the 
action.  Indeed, Sylvanergy waited almost a year to petition this 
Court.  Therefore, § 7607(b)’s 60-day filing deadline deprives this 
Court of jurisdiction over Sylvanergy’s petition to review 
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A. Sylvanergy Did Not File its Petition for Review of 
NUARB’s Denial of the NAD Within 60 Days From 
the Date Notice of Such Action. 
Sylvanergy’s petition to review NUARB’s denial of the NAD 
is late, and is therefore time-barred.  The CAA provides: 
[a]ny petition for review under [§ 7607(b)(1)] shall be filed within 
sixty days from the date notice of such promulgation, approval, or 
action appears in the Federal Register, except that if such 
petition is based solely on grounds arising after such sixtieth day, 
then any petition for review under this subsection shall be filed 
within sixty days after such grounds arise. 
42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (2012) (emphasis added).  Clearly, the 
statute establishes a filing deadline of 60 days in order to confer 
jurisdiction.  Sylvanergy attempts to challenge NUARB’s denial 
of its request for a NAD.  Sylvanergy petitioned NUARB for such 
NAD on January 15, 2013. R. at 5.  First, NUARB denied the 
request via written notification.  Next, NUARB published a draft 
permit for public comment on September 12, 2013, which also 
included the relevant applicability determination information. Id. 
at 6.  NUARB then issued the PSD permit on June 12, 2014. Id. 
Under § 7607(b)’s 60-day filing deadline, Sylvanergy 
therefore had, at the very latest, 60 days from June 12, 2014.1  
Sylvanergy petitioned this Court well after 60 days from June 12, 
2014. Indeed, the EAB order from which Sylvanergy appeals was 
not issued until over a year after NUARB issued its applicability 
determination.  Consequently, § 7607(b)’s filing deadline deprives 
this Court of jurisdiction over Sylvanergy’s petition for review of 
NUARB’s denial of the NAD. See Hawaiian Elec. Co. v. EPA, 723 
F.2d 1440, 1445 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that the court lacked 
 
 1. There is certainly an argument that the 60-day filing deadline began to 
run at the time Sylvanergy either received notice of the denial by written 
notification or when NUARB published the draft permit with the relevant 
applicability determination information. See Hawaiian Elec. Co. v. EPA, 723 
F.2d 1440, 1445 (9th Cir. 1984) (starting the clock on a company’s petition for 
review of a PSD applicability determination when the company first received 
notice and not when the action was published in the Federal Register).  Since, 
however, Sylvanergy does not meet the 60-day filing deadline from the very 
latest date, June 12, 2014, the Court need not reach these arguments. 
11
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jurisdiction to review a company’s petition to review a PSD 
applicability determination because the company did not file its 
petition within 60 days of notice of such determination); Puerto 
Rican Cement Co. v. EPA, 889 F.2d 292, 299 (1st Cir. 1989) 
(same); Utah ex rel. Utah Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, Div. of Air 
Quality v. EPA,750 F.3d 1182, 1184 (10th Cir. 2014) (same);Okla. 
Dep’t of Envtl. Quality v. EPA,740 F.3d 185, 191 (D.C. Cir. 2014) 
(same). 
B. Section 7607(b)’s 60-Day Filing Deadline is 
Jurisdictional in Nature and Thus Deprives this 
Court of Jurisdiction Over NUARB’s Denial of the 
NAD. 
Admittedly, this is a bit of a vexed question due to the 
Seventh Circuit’s decision in Clean Water Action Council of 
Northeastern Wisconsin, Inc. v. EPA, 765 F.3d 749 (7th Cir. 2014).  
In Clean Water Action Council, the Seventh Circuit ruled, in 
direct contradiction to the Tenth Circuit in Utah v. EPA,765 F.3d 
1257 (10th Cir. 2014) and the D.C. Circuit in Okla. Dep’t of Envtl. 
Quality v. EPA, 740 F.3d 185 (D.C. Cir. 2014), that § 7607(b)’s 60-
day filing deadline is not jurisdictional.  This Court, however, 
should find the wealth of case law contrary to the Seventh 
Circuit’s lone conclusion to this question amply persuasive, and 
rule that the 60-day filing deadline in § 7607(b) is jurisdictional. 
First, to sum up its rationale in holding that § 7607(b)’s filing 
deadline is not jurisdictional, the Seventh Circuit stated: 
Congress could have framed the filing and venue rules in 
jurisdictional terms, but it did not.Section 7607(b)does not 
mention jurisdiction. Nor does§ 7607(b)use language that is 
traditionally understood as jurisdictional. And the Supreme 
Court has not indicated that the§ 7607filing deadline is 
jurisdictional. That the Council did not bring its claim within 60 
days of the regulation’s publication (or in the D.C. Circuit) 
therefore does not affect this court’s jurisdiction. 
Clean Water Action Council, 765 F.3d at 752 (internal citations 
omitted).  The Tenth Circuit in Utah, however, addresses each of 
these points and applies well-established precedent and sound 
logic to reach a predictable conclusion: § 7607(b)’s filing deadline 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol7/iss1/5
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is jurisdictional. Utah, 765 F.3d at 1262 (“Accordingly, we adhere 
to the conclusion stated in our panel opinion: The 60–day 
deadline in§ 7607(b)(1)is jurisdictional, and we lack jurisdiction 
over the petitions because PacifiCorp and Utah filed their 
petitions late.”); see also Okla. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 740 F.3d at 
191 (reaching the same conclusion as the Tenth Circuit in Utah). 
Beginning with first principles, filing deadlines can be 
jurisdictional or non-jurisdictional, and in deciding which 
deadlines are jurisdictional, the court must apply a “bright-line” 
rule. See Sebelius v. Auburn Reg’l Med. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 817, 824 
(2013).  This rule focuses on Congress’s stated intention. Id. 
When Congress clearly states that a deadline is jurisdictional, the 
court must regard it as jurisdictional.Id. To make its intention 
“clear,” however, Congress need not use any particular words. Id.  
Thus, in determining whether Congress has spoken clearly, the 
court must focus on the legal character of the deadline, as shown 
through its text, context, and historical treatment. Utah, 765 F.3d 
at 1258 (citing Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick,559 U.S. 154, 166 
(2010)). 
The text of § 7607(b) uses jurisdictional terminology: “shall” 
and “petition for review.” 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (2012); see 
Auburn Reg’l Med. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. at 825–26, (stating that the 
words “shall” and “notice of appeal” carry “jurisdictional import” 
in connection with the statutory deadline for appeals from district 
courts).  This “statutory language reflects Congress’s explicit 
recognition that the 60-day deadline is jurisdictional.” Utah, 765 
F.3d at 1260. 
 Much like the statutory text, the context of § 7607(b) also 
leads to the only logical conclusion here: it is jurisdictional.  
Section 7607(b) not only supplies a deadline, but also serves as 
the jurisdictional basis for petitions like the present one. See 
Harrison v. PPG Indus., Inc., 446 U.S. 578, 593 (1980) (stating 
that “Congress . . . vested the courts of appeals with jurisdiction 
under [§ 7607(b)(1)].”).  Further, without § 7607(b)(1), this Court 
would lack jurisdiction over any petition under the CAA because 
the federal government would enjoy sovereign immunity in suits 
against the EPA. See Sierra Club v. Whitman, 268 F.3d 898, 901 
(9th Cir. 2001) (“Suits against the EPA, as against any agency of 
the United States, are barred by sovereign immunity, unless 
13
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there has been a specific waiver of that immunity.”); see 
also FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994) (stating that 
sovereign immunity shields federal agencies from suit).  Thus, 
Congress waived sovereign immunity through § 
7607(b)(1). See Royster–Clark Agribusiness, Inc. v. Johnson, 391 
F. Supp. 2d 21, 25-26 (D.D.C. 2005). 
Though § 7607(b)(1) waives sovereign immunity, the waiver 
contains limitations, including the 60–day deadline.  Through 
this deadline, § 7607(b)(1) serves a jurisdictional function by 
restricting the congressional waiver of sovereign 
immunity. See Block v. North Dakota ex rel. Bd. of Univ. & Sch. 
Lands, 461 U.S. 273, 287 (1983) (“When waiver legislation 
contains a statute of limitations, the limitations provision 
constitutes a condition on the waiver of sovereign immunity.”).  
This jurisdictional function connotes that the 60–day deadline is 
itself jurisdictional. See Miller v. FDIC, 738 F.3d 836, 845-46 (7th 
Cir. 2013); see also United States v. McGaughy, 670 F.3d 1149, 
1156 (10th Cir. 2012). 
Finally, not only does the statutory text of § 7607(b) and its 
context firmly support the argument that the 60-day filing 
deadline is jurisdictional, the historical treatment of the provision 
wrings out the last drops of the Seventh Circuit’s argument to the 
contrary in Clean Water Council.  For example, filing deadlines 
have long been considered jurisdictional when they involve 
appeals to Article III courts. See Utah, 765 F.3d at 1261 (“Section 
7607(b)(1), governing appeals to article III courts, illustrates the 
type of deadline long-considered jurisdictional.”); United States v. 
McGaughy, 670 F.3d at 1156 (“Historically, certain types of 
restrictions have long been held to be jurisdictional—the epitome 
of these are time restrictions for taking an appeal.”); see 
also Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 209 n.2 (2007) (“[I]t is 
indisputable that time limits for filing a notice of appeal have 
been treated as jurisdictional in American law for well over a 
century.”). 
If this Court were to rule that § 7607’s 60-day filing deadline 
is not jurisdictional, thus conferring jurisdiction over 
Sylvanergy’s untimely petition for review of NUARB’s 
applicability determination, it would not only cut against well-
established precedent and Congressional intent, it would 
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effectively bleed the filing deadline of all meaning and bless 
untimely petitions to the courts of appeal.  Thus, § 7607(b)(1)’s 
60-day filing deadline applies and is jurisdictional, depriving this 
Court of jurisdiction over Sylvanergy’s untimely petition for 
review of NUARB’s denial of the NAD. 
C. The “Grounds Arising After” Exception for § 
7607(b)’s 60-Day Filing Deadline and the 
“Reopener Doctrine” Do Not Excuse Sylvanergy’s 
Untimely Petition. 
Section 7607(b) provides a limited exception to its 60-day 
filing deadline, which allows for parties to file a petition after the 
60-day deadline if that petition is based “solely on grounds 
arising after such sixtieth day.” 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (2012).  
Unfortunately for Sylvanergy, “better late than never” is not 
sufficient grounds to file an untimely petition here.  Further, the 
“Reopener Doctrine” does little more to cure Sylvanergy’s 
jurisdictional defect.  As a result, this Court lacks jurisdiction to 
review NUARB’s denial of the NAD.  
Courts have interpreted the “grounds arising after” language, 
as it appears in the CAA and in the judicial review provisions of 
other statutes, as granting a new filing period where a 
petitioner's claims were not ripe at the time of the original 
action. See, e.g., Am. Road & Transp. Builders Ass’n v. EPA, 705 
F.3d 453, 457 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (interpreting 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) 
(2012)); Grp. Against Smog & Pollution, Inc. v. EPA, 665 F.2d 
1284, 1289-90 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (noting that the legislative history 
of § 7607(b)(1), indicates that the exception was intended for 
circumstances where “significant new information has become 
available”); Petro-Chem. Processing, Inc. v. EPA, 866 F.2d 433, 
437 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (holding that RCRA’s identical language 
“does not apply in these cases, in which the substantive grounds 
for the petitions arose, if at all, before the time limit expired.”). 
Here, Sylvanergy’s claims were ripe during the original filing 
period, and no intervening events gave rise to new claims 
addressed in these petitions. 
Similarly, this Court would not have jurisdiction under the 
“Reopener Doctrine,” which is limited to cases where an agency 
explicitly or implicitly reopens the substance of the action and 
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“demonstrates that the agency ‘ha[s] undertaken a serious, 
substantive reconsideration of the [existing] rule.’” P & V Enters. 
v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 516 F.3d 1021, 1023-26 (D.C. Cir. 
2008) (quoting Nat’l Mining Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 70 F.3d 
1345, 1352 (D.C. Cir. 1995)); see also Pub. Citizen v. Nuclear 
Regulatory Comm’n, 901 F.2d 147, 150-51 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (noting 
that “reopener” challenges are unavailable where an agency has 
“merely republished an existing rule in order to propose minor 
changes to it.”); see also Utah ex rel. Utah Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 
Div. of Air Quality v. EPA, 750 F.3d 1182, 1185-86 (10th Cir. 
2014) (declining to adopt the “Reopener Doctrine” but stating that 
it would not apply to the EPA’s changing of a published filing 
deadline).  Here, no event—including the appeal to the EAB and 
its subsequent order—demonstrated any intent on EPA’s part to 
undertake a “substantive reconsideration” of the applicability 
determination. R. at 8. 
Sylvanergy did not file its petition for review of NUARB’s 
applicability determination within 60 days of date notice of the 
action.  Therefore, under § 7607(b)’s 60-day filing deadline, that 
petition now carries a jurisdictional defect and jurisdictional 
defects are fatal.  This Court therefore lacks jurisdiction to review 
Sylvanergy’s untimely petition for review of NUARB’s 
applicability determination. 
II.  EVEN IF THIS COURT DID HAVE JURISDICTION 
TO REVIEW NUARB’S DENIAL OF 
SYLVANERGY’S REQUEST FOR A NON-
APPLICABILITY DETERMINATION, NUARB 
PROPERLY DETERMINED THAT THE 
SYLVANERGY FACILITY IS A “MAJOR EMITTING 
FACILITY” SUBJECT TO PSD REVIEW. 
Even if this Court did have jurisdiction to review NUARB’s 
applicability determination, Sylvanergy is still subject to PSD 
review because NUARB properly determined that the Sylvanergy 
facility is a “major emitting facility.”  NUARB reasonably 
interpreted Clean Air Act statutes and its implementing 
regulations in determining that the Sylvanergy facility is a 
“fossil-fuel fired” source.  Even if it was not, the Facility has the 
potential to emit more than 250 tons per year of carbon 
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monoxide—either way, the Facility is a “major emitting facility” 
subject to PSD review.  Thus, because Sylvanergy cannot 
demonstrate that NUARB’s determination was “arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance 
with law,” this Court must uphold NUARB’s determinations. 5 
U.S.C. § 706 (2012); see also Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, 
Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971) (“Although this inquiry 
into the facts is to be searching and careful, the ultimate 
standard of review is a narrow one.  The court is not empowered 
to substitute its judgment for that of the agency.”).     
A. The Sylvanergy Facility is a “Fossil-Fuel Fired” 
Source Subject to the 100 Ton-Per-Year Threshold 
Under § 7479(1) of the Clean Air Act. 
The PSD requirements under the Clean Air Act apply to the 
construction of any new “major emitting facility.” 42 U.S.C. § 
7479 (2012); 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(a)(2) (2015).  A facility is a “major 
emitting facility” if it falls within one of the twenty-six listed 
categories of sources—one of which being “[f]ossil fuel-fired steam 
electric plants of more than 250 million British thermal units per 
hour heat input”—and emits or has the potential to emit one 
hundred tons or more of any regulated pollutant per year. Id.  
The law also considers a facility not among the listed categories 
as a major emitting facility if it emits, or has the potential to 
emit, 250 tons per year or more of any regulated pollutant. Id.  
Accordingly, since NUARB correctly determined that the 
Sylvanergy facility was a “fossil-fuel fired” source subject to the 
100-ton-per-year threshold, it is a “major emitting facility” subject 
to PSD review. 
Although the Clean Air Act does not expressly define “fossil-
fuel fired” under its PSD provisions, it does however, define it 
under its New Source Performance Standards (“NSPS”); 
specifically, subpart D entitled “Standards of Performance for 
Fossil-Fuel-Fired Steam Generators.”  There, the EPA defines a 
“fossil-fuel-fired steam generation unit” as a “furnace or boiler 
used in the process of burning fossil fuel for the purpose of 
producing steam by heat transfer.” 40 C.F.R. § 60.41 (2015). 
Applying this definition, the Sylvanergy facility is a “fossil-
fuel fired” source subject to the 100-ton-per-year threshold in the 
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“major emitting facility” definition.  The Facility would house a 
500 million Btu/hour electricity generation unit capable of 40-MW 
of electrical generation. R. at 5.  The facility will also consist of 
“two ultra-low sulfur diesel (ULSD) start-up burners, each with a 
maximum heat input rate of 60 MMBtu/hr.” Id.  Further, the 
Facility will emit 110 tons of NOx per year and 255 tons of CO 
per year. Id.  An application of the facts to a literal reading of the 
CAA definition therefore renders NUARB’s determination more 
than reasonable, and certainly not “arbitrary, capricious, an 
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5 
U.S.C. § 706 (2012).  The Sylvanergy facility is a clearly a 
“furnace or boiler used in the process of burning fossil fuel for the 
purpose of producing steam by heat transfer.” 
Furthermore, NUARB’s determination is consistent with the 
Clean Air Act.  Two other programs under the Act define “fossil-
fuel fired” in harmony with NUARB’s determination here.  To 
illustrate, the CAA’s “Acid Rain Program” defines “fossil-fuel 
fired” as “the combustion of fossil fuel or any derivative of fossil 
fuel, alone or in combination with any other fuel, independent of 
the percentage of fossil fuel consumed in any calendar year 
(expressed in mmBtu).” 40 C.F.R. § 72.2 (2015).  Similarly, the 
CAA’s “Cross-State Air Pollution Rule” defines a “fossil-fuel fired” 
unit as one that “combusts any amount of fossil fuel in 2005 or 
later.” Federal Implementation Plans: Interstate Transport of 
Fine Particulate Matter and Ozone and Correction of SIP 
Approvals, 76 Fed. Reg. 48,207 (Aug. 8, 2011) (to be codified at 40 
C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 72, 78, 97).  The common “fossil-fuel fired” 
denominator in the CAA: combustion of fossil fuel.  Here, 
NUARB’s determination that Sylvanergy’s sulfur diesel burners 
subject it to the 100-ton-per-year “major emitting” threshold is 
consistent with the Act and is certainly not “arbitrary, capricious, 
an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5 
U.S.C. § 706 (2012). 
Consequently, this Court must uphold NUARB’s 
determination that the Sylvanergy facility is a “fossil-fuel fired” 
source subject to the 100-ton-per-year “major emitting facility” 
threshold, and is thus subject to PSD review. 
B. Because the Restriction on Operating Hours in the 
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Village of Forestdale’s Site Plan Approval is Not a 
“Federally Enforceable” Limitation, the 
Sylvanergy Facility has the “Potential to Emit” 
More than 250 Tons Per Year of Carbon Monoxide. 
Even if the Sylvanergy facility were not a “fossil-fuel fired” 
source, it would nevertheless be subject to PSD review because it 
has the “potential to emit [250] tons per year or more of any air 
pollutant.” 42 U.S.C. § 7479 (2012) (defining “major emitting 
facility”).  Based on a 96% capacity factor, the Sylvanergy facility 
would emit 255 tons per year of carbon monoxide, putting it 
squarely within the definition of a “major emitting facility.” R. at 
5.  Sylvanergy would contend, however, that the limitation on its 
operating hours, present in the Village of Forestdale’s site plan 
approval, is a federally enforceable limitation limiting its capacity 
factor to 75%.  This in turn would limit its carbon monoxide 
emission to 190 tons per year, and it therefore would not have the 
“potential to emit” 250 tons per year. R. at 5-6.  NUARB correctly 
determined, however, that the limitation on operating hours in 
the Village of Forestdale’s site plan approval is not a “federally 
enforceable” limitation. R. at 5.  Consequently, Sylvanergy is—yet 
again—a “major emitting facility” subject to PSD review. 
The “potential to emit” means: 
the maximum capacity of a stationary source to emit a pollutant 
under its physical and operational design. Any physical or 
operational limitation on the capacity of the source to emit a 
pollutant, including air pollution control equipment and 
restrictions on hours of operation or on the type or amount of 
material combusted, stored, or processed, shall be treated as part 
of its design if the limitation or the effect it would have on 
emissions is federally enforceable. 
40 C.F.R. § 52.21(b)(4) (2015) (emphasis added).  So, although a 
restriction on operating hours is expressly listed in the definition 
of “potential to emit” as a limiting factor in a source’s design, such 
restriction must still be “federally enforceable.” 
In turn, the term “federally enforceable” means “‘legally and 
practicably enforceable by a state or local air pollution control 
agency.’” Weiler v. Chatham Forest Prods., Inc., 392 F.3d 532, 535 
(2d Cir. 2004) (emphasis added) (quoting EPA Interim Policy on 
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Federal Enforceability of Limitations on Potential to Emit, at 3-4 
(Jan. 22, 1996)); see also 40 C.F.R. § 51.166 (2015) (emphasis 
added) (defining “federally enforceable” as “all limitations and 
conditions which are enforceable by the Administrator”).  
Accordingly, a proposed facility that is physically capable of 
emitting major levels of the relevant pollutants is to be 
considered a “major emitting facility” under the CAA unless there 
are legally and practicably enforceable mechanisms in place that 
are enforceable by a state or local air pollution control agency. 
The limitation on hours of operation at issue was adopted in 
order to mitigate the impact of log trucks bringing raw logs to the 
Facility, and would bring the operating hours of the Facility to 
6,500 per year. R. at 5.  Crucially though, the limitation is 
“enforced by the building inspector of the Village of Forestdale.” 
Id.  This limitation is therefore far from being “federally 
enforceable.”  Indeed, the state and local air pollution agencies 
may not even enforce this limitation.  Much like NUARB’s 
determination that the Sylvanergy facility is a “fossil-fuel fired” 
source, the applicable definitions here foreclose Sylvanergy’s 
arguments to the contrary: NUARB’s determination is more than 
reasonable, and certainly not “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of 
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 
706 (2012).  This Court therefore must uphold NUARB’s 
determination that the hours-of-operation-limitation in the 
Village of Forestdale’s site plane approval is not a “federally 
enforceable” limitation bringing Sylvanergy’s carbon monoxide 
emissions below 250 tons per year.  The Sylvanergy facility is 
thus a “major emitting facility” subject to PSD review. 
This Court should not—indeed cannot—disturb NUARB’s 
determinations.  Awash with reasonableness and sound logic, 
NUARB’s determinations were grounded in applicable statutes 
and were certainly not “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of 
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.”  As a result, 
this Court must uphold NUARB’s determinations and rule that 
the Sylvanergy facility is a “major emitting facility” subject to 
PSD review. 
III.  THE SYLVANERGY FACILITY IS SUBJECT TO 
PSD REVIEW FOR GHGS BECAUSE IT IS AN 
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“ANYWAY SOURCE” EMITTING MORE THAN A 
DE MINIMIS AMOUNT OF GHGS. 
The Supreme Court and the EPA have recently resolved a 
previously unsettled issue: whether GHGs are subject to 
regulation under the CAA.  They are.  Under the PSD permitting 
program, sources that meet certain thresholds must be “subject to 
the best available control technology for each pollutant subject to 
regulation” under the CAA. 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(4) (2012) 
(emphasis added).  GHGs are now treated as pollutants “subject 
to regulation” when they are emitted from facilities that must 
also obtain a PSD permit “anyway” due to their emission of other 
pollutants. Utility Air Regulatory Grp. (UARG) v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 
2427, 2447-49 (2014).  In ruling that GHGs are now subject to 
PSD review, the Supreme Court first tracked the law’s recent 
evolution. Id. 
In 2009, EPA published its finding that GHGs endanger both 
public health and welfare and that the combined emissions of 
these GHGs from new motor vehicles cause and contribute to air 
pollution that endangers public health and welfare. 
Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse 
Gases Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 
66,496 (Dec. 15, 2009) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. ch. 1).  The 
regulation of GHGs in the motor vehicle industry posited the 
question of whether GHGs would now be regulated under PSD 
review.  In 2011, the EPA answered this question in the 
affirmative.  Motor vehicle GHG standards also trigger 
permitting requirements under the CAA. Reconsideration of 
Interpretation of Regulations That Determine Pollutants Covered 
by Clean Air Act Permitting Programs, 75 Fed. Reg. 17,004 (Apr. 
2, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts 50, 51, 70, 71). 
The EPA decided regulating all facilities that release GHGs 
under the PSD program would be nearly impossible, so it issued a 
rule to temper the scope of the regulation: the “Tailoring Rule.” 
Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse 
Gas Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 31,514, 31,523 (June 3, 2010) (to 
be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 70, 71).  Step One of the 
Tailoring Rule began on January 2, 2011, and ended on June 30, 
2011. Id.  This step covers what EPA deems “anyway sources”—
that is, facilities that would be subject to PSD review for GHGs if 
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they were subject to PSD review “anyway” based on emissions of 
pollutants other than GHGs. Id.  Step Two began on July 1, 2011, 
and continued thereafter to cover both “anyway sources” 
releasing at least 75,000 tons per year of CO2e and to other large 
emitters of GHGs. Id. at 31,523. 
The EPA also attempted to narrow the scope of GHG 
regulation by exempting certain biogenic carbon emissions in the 
“Deferral Rule.” Deferral for CO2 Emissions From Bioenergy and 
Other Biogenic Sources Under the Prevention of Significant 
Deterioration (PSD) and Title V Programs, 76 Fed. Reg. 43,490 
(July 20, 2011) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 70, 71).  
The Deferral Rule exempts from regulation, for a period of three 
years, biogenic carbon dioxide sources that trigger PSD and Title 
V permitting. Id. at 43,493.  In promulgating this rule, EPA cited 
its ongoing efforts to understand the unique characteristics of 
biogenic carbon dioxide and how it should be regulated. Id. at 
15,251.  The Deferral Rule also contains a provision stating that 
absent agency action, on July 21, 2014, biogenic carbon dioxide 
will be regulated under PSD and Title V programs, as modified by 
the Tailoring Rule. Id. at 43,507. 
The Deferral Rule was challenged on the grounds that the 
plain language of the CAA requires that GHGs be subject to PSD 
review because of the statutory definition of “major emitting 
facility.” Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. EPA, 722 F.3d 401, 409 
(D.C. Cir. 2013); 42 U.S.C. § 7479 (2012) (a “major emitting 
facility” is any “stationary sources[]” that “emit[s], or ha[s] the 
potential to emit,” certain specified amounts of “any air 
pollutant”).  The court agreed with the petitioners that the EPA’s 
rule was arbitrary and capricious because there was no 
documented rationale in how the EPA determined which sources 
to exempt from regulation. Id. at 411.  Accordingly, the court 
vacated the Deferral Rule. Id. at 412.  As a result of the Deferral 
Rule being vacated, biogenic facilities subject to PSD review for 
other pollutants are also subject to PSD review for GHGs. In re 
Energy Answers Arecibo, LLC, PSD Appeal Nos. 13-05 though 13-
09, slip op. (EAB Mar. 25, 2014) (remanding a permit for PSD 
review for GHGs after the Deferral Rule was vacated). 
In 2014, the Supreme Court reviewed this evolution of GHG 
regulation and answered the question of “whether it was 
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permissible for the EPA to determine that its motor-vehicle 
[GHG] regulations automatically triggered permitting 
requirements under the Act for stationary sources that emit 
[GHGs].” UARG, 134 S. Ct. at 2434.  Put simply, the Court 
answered the question affirmatively—with some limitations. Id. 
at 2447. 
The Court held that it was impermissible for the EPA to 
require PSD review for facilities’ GHG emissions solely based on 
their GHG emissions. Id.  The Court, however, stated that the 
EPA’s decision to regulate GHGs from “anyway sources” was 
permissible, so long as they emit more than a de minimis amount. 
Id. at 2448.  The Court did not indicate what would rise above a 
de minimis amount, but did state that the 75,000 tons-per-year 
threshold in the Tailoring Rule may be an indicator. Id. at 2448.  
In response, the EPA amended its PSD program to effectively 
uphold the regulation of GHGs under PSD review for “anyway 
sources.” Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V 
Permitting for Greenhouse Gases: Removal of Certain Vacated 
Elements, 80 Fed. Reg. 50,199, 50,200 (Aug. 19, 2015) (codified at 
40 C.F.R. § 51.166(b)(48)(iv) (2015)). 
A. Sylvanergy’s Proposed Facility is Subject to PSD 
Review for GHG Emissions Under the UARG 
Decision Because It is an “Anyway Source” 
Subject to PSD Review for the Emission of Other 
Pollutants and Emits GHGs Above a de minimis 
Level. 
Sylvanergy is subject to PSD review for GHGs under the 
Supreme Court’s ruling in UARG because it is subject to PSD 
review “anyway” for other pollutants.  Sylvanergy underwent 
PSD review for particulates, sulphur dioxide, nitrogen oxide, and 
carbon monoxide. R. 6.  As a result, it is an “anyway source” 
because it is subject to PSD review anyway for other regulated 
pollutants.  UARG, 134 S. Ct. at 2448.  Additionally, it emits 
GHGs above a de minimis level.  Although the EPA has not yet 
set a true de minimis level, the Supreme Court intimated that the 
Tailoring Rule’s 75,000 tons per year should be instructive. Id. at 
2448.  Guided by the Court’s language, a facility that will emit 
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350,000 tons per year of carbon dioxide equivalents would 
certainly be more than a de minimis emitter. R. at 5. 
Furthermore, it is irrelevant that the UARG decision was 
rendered after Sylvanergy’s permit process began.  “The Clean 
Air Act unambiguously requires [a facility] to demonstrate that 
[it] complies with the regulations in effect at the time the [p]ermit 
is issued.” Sierra Club v. EPA, 762 F.3d 971, 973-74 (9th Cir. 
2014) (remanding a permit for PSD review of GHGs because the 
regulation of GHGs under the PSD program began while the 
facility’s permit was being judicially reviewed).  Accordingly, even 
though Sylvanergy began its permitting process before the UARG 
decision, its permit must reflect the regulations as amended by 
the decision. 
B. Sylvanergy’s Proposed Facility is Not Exempt 
from PSD Review for GHGs Under the Deferral 
Rule Because the Rule was Vacated and has 
Otherwise Expired. 
The Deferral Rule exempts biogenic carbon dioxide sources 
from triggering PSD and Title V permitting requirements for a 
period of three years. 76 Fed. Reg. at 43,493.  Sylvanergy falls 
into such category because it would release biogenic carbon 
dioxide at a rate of 350,000 tons per year of carbon dioxide 
equivalents. R. at 5.  The Deferral Rule, however, was vacated 
upon review in the D.C. Circuit. Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 722 
F.3d at 412.  Therefore, such exemption does not apply. 
Even if the rule were not vacated, the rule itself states that it 
expired on July 21, 2014. 76 Fed. Reg. at 43,507.  Moreover, it is 
irrelevant that the rule was still in effect at the time NUARB 
published Sylvanergy’s draft permit.  Similarly, in Energy 
Answers Arecibo, the Deferral Rule was still effective at the time 
the draft permit was being reviewed; however, when the permit 
was in front of the EAB, the Deferral Rule had been vacated. PSD 
Appeal Nos. 13-05 though 13-09, slip op. at 29.  The Board 
remanded the case with an order to conduct PSD review for 
GHGs because the permit was no longer in compliance with the 
current law. Id. at 29, 30.  Likewise, the EAB here appropriately 
recognized that Sylvanergy is not exempt from PSD review for 
GHGs because that exemption expired. R. at 6. 
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The EAB correctly determined that Sylvanergy is subject to 
PSD review for GHGs because it is an “anyway source” that 
releases GHGs above a de minimis level.  Further, it is not 
exempt under the Deferral Rule because it has been vacated and 
otherwise is expired. 
IV.  NUARB IMPROPERLY REJECTED 
CONSIDERATION OF A WOOD GASIFICATION 
AND PARTIAL CARBON CAPTURE AND 
STORAGE PLANT AS BACT FOR SYLVANERGY 
BECAUSE IT IS TECHNICALLY FEASIBLE AND 
DOES NOT REDEFINE THE SOURCE. 
Any major stationary source, including a bioenergy facility, 
that is required to obtain a PSD permit must address the BACT 
requirement for GHGs if it is subject to PSD review for other 
pollutants and emits GHGs above a de minimis level. UARG, 134 
S. Ct. at 2448; 40 C.F.R. § 52.166(b)(48) (2015).  BACT means: 
an emission limitation based on the maximum degree of 
reduction of each pollutant subject to regulation under this 
chapter emitted from or which results from any major emitting 
facility, which the permitting authority, on a case-by-case basis, 
taking into account energy, environmental, and economic impacts 
and other costs, determines is achievable for such facility through 
application of production processes and available methods, 
systems, and techniques, including fuel cleaning, clean fuels, or 
treatment or innovative fuel combustion techniques for control of 
each such pollutant. 
42 U.S.C. § 7479(3) (2012). 
To determine BACT, the EPA recommends following its 5-
step process, known as the “top-down” method. U.S. EPA Office of 
Air Quality Planning & Standards, New Source Review Workshop 
Manual at B.2 (Oct. 1990) (Draft) [“NSR Manual”].  This same 
top-down method should be followed when conducting a BACT 
analysis for GHG emissions. U.S. EPA Office of Air Quality 
Planning & Standards, PSD and Title V Permitting Guidance for 
Greenhouse Gases at 17 (Mar. 2011). 
Though the NSR Manual’s top-down analysis is not 
mandatory, a careful and detailed analysis of the criteria 
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identified in the regulatory definition is nevertheless required; 
the methodology in the NSR Manual provides a framework that 
assures adequate consideration of the regulatory criteria and 
consistency within the PSD permitting program. In re Cardinal 
FG Co., 12 E.A.D. 153, 162 (EAB 2005).  Consequently, if the 
required criteria are not considered, the case will be remanded 
with instructions to follow the top-down method. In re Knauf 
Fiber Glass, 8 E.A.D. 121 (EAB 1999). 
A. NUARB Should Have Followed the 5-step BACT 
Analysis Recommended by the EPA. 
1. Step One of the BACT analysis is to identify all “potentially 
available” control technologies. NSR Manual at B.5. 
2. In Step Two, control technologies are eliminated if they are 
“technically infeasible.” Id. at B.7. 
a. A control technology is presumed to be feasible if it is 
“demonstrated.” In re Cardinal FG Co., 12 E.A.D. at 162.  
In turn, a control technology is demonstrated if it has been 
installed and operated successfully elsewhere on a similar 
facility. Id. (citing NSR Manual at B.17). 
b. A control technology is also considered feasible under Step 
Two if it is both “available” and “applicable.” Id.  
Technology is considered available if it “can be obtained by 
the applicant through commercial channels or is otherwise 
available within the common sense meaning of the term.” 
Id.  An available technology is applicable if it “can 
reasonably be installed and operated on the source type 
under consideration.” Id.  Conversely, “technologies in the 
pilot scale testing stages of development would not be 
considered available for BACT review.” Id. 
c. In Step Two, a permitting authority’s decision to eliminate 
potential control options as a matter of technical 
infeasibility must be adequately explained and justified. 
In re Steel Dynamics, 9 E.A.D. 165, 192 (EAB 2000) 
(“cursory, conclusory, speculative, and unsubstantiated 
opinion[s]” were not sufficient).  Where a more stringent 
technology is not evaluated as BACT because the 
permitting authority erred in not identifying it as an 
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“available” option, a remand is appropriate. In re Cardinal 
FG Co., 12 E.A.D. at 168.  
3. In Step Three, the remaining control technologies are ranked 
in order of overall control effectiveness. NSR Manual at B.8. 
4. In Step Four, the applicant considers energy, environmental, 
and economic impacts of each control technology. Id.  If a 
control technology is eliminated at this step, the rationale 
should be documented for public record. Id. at B.9. 
5. Finally, in Step Five, the most effective control option that 
has not been eliminated yet is selected as BACT for the 
pollutant and emission unit under review. Id. 
 
In selecting BACT, the EPA normally does not require that 
the facility change the fundamental scope of the plant proposed 
by the permit applicant—known as redefining the source. Sierra 
Club v. EPA, 499 F.3d 653, 654 (7th Cir. 2007); NSR Manual at 
B.13.  For example, requiring a coal-fired plant to use nuclear 
fuel would require redesign from the ground up. Id.  However, 
“pollution controls that retain the facility’s fundamental product 
or purpose do not ‘redefine the source,’ regardless of whether they 
require modification of the permit-applicant’s preferred design.” 
In re Prairie State Generating Co., 13 E.A.D. 1, 20 (EAB 2006) 
(emphasis added). 
In determining whether technology impermissibly redefines 
the source, the facility’s fundamental product or purpose is 
determined by examining the proposed facility’s application. Id. 
at 22.  The purpose should be objective and must focus on the 
overall business purpose for the proposed facility. Utah Chapter 
of the Sierra Club v. Air Quality Bd., 226 P.3d 719, 732 (Utah 
2009).  Permitting authorities should be “wary of the risk of 
applicants describing a project in such a limited manner that they 
are able to circumvent the goals of BACT, which include 
encouraging the use of new technologies.” Id. 
Here, NUARB correctly determined that a wood gasification 
and partial carbon capture and storage plant is technically 
feasible, but it erred in its BACT analysis by failing to follow the 
top-down method and by incorrectly determining that the storage 
plant would redefine the source.  NUARB’s shortcomings make 
its decision arbitrary and capricious, warranting reversal of the 
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decision below and remand of the permit for a complete, correct 
BACT analysis. 
B. NUARB Correctly Determined that Wood 
Gasification and Partial Carbon Capture and 
Storage is Technically Feasible Because it has Not 
Only Been Demonstrated but it is also Available 
and Applicable. 
NUARB correctly determined that the implementation of a 
wood gasification and partial carbon capture and storage is 
technically feasible. R. at 13.  The technology is feasible because 
it is not only demonstrated but is also available and applicable.  
The technology is demonstrated because it is being used at the 
Decatur Carbon Sequestration Demonstration facility. R. at 12. A 
control technology is demonstrated if it has been installed and 
operated successfully elsewhere on a similar facility. NSR 
Manual at B.17.  The Decatur facility is “very similar” to the 
facility proposed by Sylvanergy. Id.  Furthermore, the proposed 
facility is located over a geological shale formation in Forestdale 
that is an “ideal location” for a carbon capture and storage 
facility: much like the Decatur facility. Id.  So, because of the 
Decatur facility’s successful implementation of a partial carbon 
capture and storage facility, this technology is a demonstrated 
control technology for the Sylvanergy facility. 
Additionally, partial carbon capture and storage is 
technically feasible because it is both available and applicable.  
Partial carbon capture and storage is commercially available, as 
proven by its usage at the Decatur plant. R. at 12.  The storage 
plant is also applicable to Sylvanergy’s proposed facility because 
it has been used on a similar facility—the Decatur facility. Id.  
The Rhodes and Keith study also supports the proposition that 
partial carbon capture and storage is feasible by using 
technologies already in use. Id; J.S. Rhodes and D.W. Keith, 
Engineering Economic Analysis of Biomass IGCC with Carbon 
Capture and Storage, 29 BIOMASS AND BIOENERGY 440, 441 
(2005) (“Only biomass-CCS can both provide low-carbon energy 
products and effectively remove carbon from the natural carbon 
cycle.”). The wood gasification and partial carbon capture and 
storage plant would therefore not only be potentially available 
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under Step One but also technically feasible under Step Two of 
the BACT analysis. 
C. NUARB Incorrectly Determined that Wood 
Gasification and Partial Carbon Capture and 
Storage Would Redefine the Source Because it 
Would Not Change the Fundamental Product and 
Purpose of the Facility. 
NUARB agreed with the factual propositions supporting the 
use of partial carbon capture and storage, but it incorrectly 
determined that the partial carbon capture and storage facility 
was inappropriate as BACT because it redefines the Facility. R. 
at 12.  Sylvanergy proposed to burn fossil fuel and wood to 
generate electricity. R. at 13.  Its proposed product and purpose 
are wood and the generation of electricity.  Implementing the 
wood gasification and partial carbon capture and storage plant 
would advance the Facility’s fundamental purpose: the 
generation of electricity. Implementing the wood gasification and 
partial carbon capture and storage plant would maintain the 
Facility’s fundamental product: wood.  The only minor 
modification the Facility would be subject to is gasifying the 
wood.  The source is not redefined. See In re Prairie State 
Generating Co., 13 E.A.D. at 20 (holding that “pollution controls 
that retain the facility’s fundamental product or purpose do not 
‘redefine the source,’ regardless of whether they require 
modification of the permit-applicant’s preferred design”); Sierra 
Club v. EPA, 499 F.3d at 654 (holding that a BACT requirement 
on a coal-fired facility to rebuild the facility from the ground up to 
utilize nuclear fuel was redefining the source). 
Also, this Court can not allow Sylvanergy to describe its 
project in such a limited way as to circumvent the goals of BACT. 
Utah Chapter of the Sierra Club, 226 P.3d at 732 (cautioning that 
permitting authorities should be “wary of the risk of applicants 
describing a project in such a limited manner that they are able 
to circumvent the goals of BACT, which include encouraging the 
use of new technologies”).  The fundamental purpose underlying 
BACT is to compel “rapid adoption of improvements in technology 
as new sources are built.” S. Rep. No. 95-127, at 29 (1977).  As 
wood gasification and partial carbon capture and storage is 
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quickly becoming the standard as BACT for facilities, NUARB 
should not have been eliminated it. See Margaret E. Peloso and 
Matthew Dobbins, Greenhouse Gas PSD Permitting: The Year in 
Review, 42 TEX. ENVTL. L.J. 233, 245 (2012). Accordingly, it is 
becoming “more difficult for future applicants to dismiss CCS 
[carbon capture and storage] . . . as BACT.” Id. at 253.  As such, it 
should not have been excluded from the BACT analysis in Step 
Two. 
Therefore, in Step Three, the remaining technologies should 
have been ranked by their control effectiveness.  In other words, 
the Sustainable Forest Plan would be ranked first, and wood 
gasification and partial carbon capture and storage would have 
been ranked second. 
IV.  NUARB FURTHER ERRED IN ITS BACT 
ANALYSIS BY IMPERMISSIBLY IMPOSING THE 
SUSTAINABLE FOREST PLAN AS BACT FOR THE 
PROPOSED SYLVANERGY FACILITY BECAUSE 
IT FAILED TO CONSIDER ITS ADVERSE 
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS. 
Under Step Four of the BACT analysis, control technologies 
are to be eliminated if they have any significant or unusual 
environmental impacts. NSR Manual at B.47.  This analysis 
should be conducted based on a consideration of site-specific 
circumstances and should be performed for the entire hierarchy of 
technologies. Id.  First, the permitting authority performs a 
qualitative or semi-qualitative screening to narrow the analysis 
to discharges with potential for causing adverse environmental 
effects. NSR Manual at B.48.  Then the mass composition of any 
such discharges are assessed and quantified to the extent 
possible, based on readily available information. Id.  After 
reviewing this information, the adverse environmental effects of a 
technology may result in the top-control-option being elimination. 
NSR Manual at B.8-9. 
The permit issuer must give reasonable consideration to 
allegations of adverse environmental impacts and must fully and 
meaningfully respond to any related public comments. In re Old 
Dominion, 1992 EPA App. LEXIS 37, at *10 (EAB Jan. 29, 1992); 
see also 40 C.F.R. § 124.17(a)(2) (2015) (permitting agencies must 
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“briefly describe and respond to all significant comments on the 
draft permit”).  It is permissible to dismiss allegations of 
environmental impacts where such allegations are unsupported 
by evidence. In re Old Dominion, 1992 EPA App. LEXIS at *14.  
Otherwise, each allegation requires a response.  These responses 
should not be conclusory; rather, they should provide references 
and detailed analyses for why the permitting authority responded 
to the allegations of adverse impacts the way it did. In re Indeck-
Elwood, LLC, 13 E.A.D. 126, 154 (EAB 2006).  Where the 
permitting authority’s rationale is not clear, its responses do not 
reflect careful consideration. In re Knauf Fiber Glass, 8 E.A.D. at 
132.  And where responses do not reflect careful consideration, 
the permitting authority has committed clear error. Id. 
To illustrate, in Indeck-Elwood, LLC, the permitting 
authority, without citing sufficient evidence for its reasoning, 
simply stated that a technology would have no adverse 
environmental impacts. Id.  The permitting authority’s decisions 
were in error because they were “largely conclusory and [did] not 
provide or reference any more detailed analyses that support[ed] 
its conclusions.” Id.  Conversely, the permitting authority’s 
reasoning is sufficiently supported when it relies on evidence to 
state that a technology would not have significant adverse 
environmental impacts. In re Prairie State Generating Co., 13 
E.A.D. at 46 (relying on a biological opinion that there would be 
no significant environmental impact). 
A. NUARB Acted Arbitrarily in Step Four of its BACT 
Analysis by Failing to Adequately Consider 
Comments Raised by SOC and by Instead Relying 
on an Inapplicable State-Issued Executive Order. 
Here, NUARB’s failure to adequately address the adverse 
environmental impacts of the Sustainable Forest Plan constitutes 
clear error.  SOC submitted “extensive comments and ecological 
studies” to support its argument that monoculture forestry 
practices, such as the Sustainable Forest Plan, destroy 
biodiversity and promote tree diseases and pest infestations. R. at 
12.  NUARB did not address these comments. R. at 12.  NUARB’s 
failure violates the regulatory requirement to “briefly describe 
and respond to all significant comments on the draft permit,” 40 
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C.F.R. § 124.17(a)(2) (2015).  NUARB’s decision was therefore 
arbitrary and capricious. 
NUARB also impermissibly relied on Governor Comet’s 
Executive Order 005-12 in justifying its decision to impose the 
Sustainable Forest Plan as BACT. R. at 7.  Executive Order 005-
12 requires that “all State agencies in New Union must, to the 
extent allowed by law, ensure that any new construction project 
they undertake or approve will be carbon neutral.” Id.  Because 
the Executive Order is inapplicable here, NUARB’s reliance on it 
was in error.  First, the Executive Order applies only to “State 
agencies.” Id.  NUARB, however, operates under delegated 
authority from the EPA, so it truly functions as a federal agency. 
R. at 5; In re Knauf Fiber Glass, 8 E.A.D. at 174 (agencies 
operating under delegating authority are federal agencies).  
Therefore, the NUARB does not fall within the scope of the 
Executive Order. 
Additionally, the Executive Order should only be complied 
with “to the extent allowed by law.” R. at 7.  Therefore, the CAA 
statutory scheme and principles governing the BACT analysis 
should govern. In re Sierra Pac. Indus., PSD Appeal Nos. 13-01 
through 13-04, slip op. at 31 (EAB July 18, 2013) (“Neither [an] 
Executive Order nor EPA policy statements, however, amend 
EPA’s statutory or regulatory requirements and obligations.”).  As 
required by the CAA and the NSR Manual, NUARB must 
consider adverse environmental impacts and make changes 
accordingly in its selection of BACT. 42 U.S.C. § 7479(3) (2012) 
(emphasis added); NSR Manual at B.48.  This consideration is so 
important that the permitting authority should select a slightly 
less effective control technology if a more effective control 
technology has significant adverse environmental impacts. Mont. 
Env’t Info. Ctr. v. Mont. Dep’t Envtl. Quality, 2004 ML 682, 2004 
Mont. Dist. LEXIS 3151, at *37 (Mont., Mar. 30, 2004). 
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B. Under Step Four of its BACT analysis, NUARB 
Should Have Determined that Partial Carbon 
Capture and Storage is BACT Because of the 
Sustainable Forest Plan’s Significant Adverse 
Environmental Impacts. 
Step Four of the BACT analysis requires the permitting 
authority to consider economic impacts of the remaining 
technologies in addition to their environmental impacts.  In 
weighing the costs of the two competing technologies, partial 
carbon capture and storage is admittedly not the cheapest.  This 
is not unusual however, in the regulation of facilities.  Indeed, the 
EPA has acknowledged that “present add-on controls for CO2 are 
generally not cheap.” U.S. EPA Office of Air and Radiation, 
Guidance for Determining Best Available Control Technology for 
Reducing Carbon Dioxide Emissions from Bioenergy Production 
at 24 (Mar. 2011).  However, the permitting authority does not 
have the discretion to eliminate a technology merely because it is 
expensive.  It only has the authority to consider the economic 
impact of a technology in comparison to its effectiveness and its 
environmental impacts. Id. at 17. 
Here, the cost of partial carbon capture and storage is a 
nonstarter for three reasons.  First, Sylvanergy made no objection 
to the technology based on its costs, and the impacts considered 
in Step Four are evaluated on a case-by-case basis. Id.  In this 
case, the argument that the technology is too expensive must 
therefore fail because it is obviously not a concern for the 
permitted entity. 
Second, even conceding that the cost of partial carbon 
capture should be considered, its indirect economic impacts offset 
its initial cost.  One such indirect economic impact is potential 
economic benefits such as tax incentives. Id. at 25.  Here, 
Sylvanergy would benefit from the federal Renewable Electricity 
Production Tax Credit, a per-kilowatt-hour tax credit for 
electricity generated by qualified energy resources including 
biomass. Id. at 26.  This economic benefit mitigates the cost of 
partial carbon capture and storage. 
Third, the adverse environmental impacts of the Sustainable 
Forest Plan far outweigh any economic concern about partial 
carbon capture and storage.  The EPA recognizes that “where the 
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record shows that requiring a particular control option as BACT 
would counteract, or work at cross purposes from, policies 
intended to promote renewable energy and biomass, this may 
form part of the justification for eliminating an option from 
further consideration.” Id. at 25.  The EPA, and agencies 
exercising its delegated authority, are “charged with being the 
federal government’s guardian of the environment.” State of New 
York v. Schenectady Chems., Inc., 459 N.Y.S.2d 971, 978 (1984).  
Certainly, selecting a technology that “destroy[s] biodiversity and 
promote[s] tree diseases and pest invasions” does not coincide 
with the permitting authority’s role as guardian of the 
environment. See R. at 12.  The permitting authority should—
indeed must—consider these serious threats to the environment.  
Here, however, NUARB merely winked at the allegations with 
complete disregard. Id.  This neglect not only makes its decision 
arbitrary and capricious but also violates the clear statutory 
mandate of the CAA itself. 42 U.S.C. § 7479(3) (2012) (defining 
BACT as “taking into account . . . environmental . . . impacts). 
Due to the Sustainable Forest Plan’s adverse environmental 
impacts, the partial carbon capture and storage facility is the 
most effective control technology that was not eliminated at some 
other step in the BACT analysis.  Failing to eliminate the 
Sustainable Forest Plan in Step Four was clear error by NUARB.  
Its decision should therefore be vacated, and this Court should 
remand the case for a correct BACT analysis. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Sylvanergy does not have the luxury of invoking this Court’s 
jurisdiction over its untimely petition to review a state agency’s 
applicability determination—and even if it could, the state agency 
made the correct applicability determination.  Additionally, the 
Supreme Court’s decision in UARG subjects Sylvanergy to PSD 
review for its GHG emissions.  Last, NUARB erred in its BACT 
analysis.  In other words, NUARB made one correct 
determination that this Court lacks jurisdiction to review and one 
incorrect determination that this Court should remand in order to 
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correct the error.  Therefore, in order to further the purpose of the 
Clean Air Act, this Court should remand the PSD permit to 
“insure that economic growth will occur in a manner consistent 
with the preservation of existing clean air resources.” 42 U.S.C. § 
7470(3) (2012). 
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